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THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY
The disagreement with János naturally does not concern the characterization of 
the Soviet-type, centrally planned socialist economy as the Shortage Economy 
(Kornai 1980a). There can be no doubt that in all versions of that kind of economy, 
shortage phenomena (including rationing, queues, waiting lists, forced substitu-
tion, and purchase postponement or outright desistence) were general, frequent, 
intense, and chronic. Whether money prices were stable, rising, or falling, those 
economies were afflicted by large-scale, endemic excess demand at prices below 
the market-clearing level; whenever technically feasible, re-trading occurred at 
higher black market prices (for definitions and a review of attempted measure-
ments, see Nuti 1986). 
Nor does my disagreement concern the adverse consequences of shortages. 
A by-product of repressed inflation was over-full employment of labor, i.e., ex-
cess demand for labor by enterprises (involving low labor discipline, high job 
turnover and wage drift). Consequences included consumers’ frustration at their 
inability to secure goods and services at official prices, lower incentives to supply 
additional labor and effort, and production inefficiencies due to erratic supplies 
of inputs. Inequality in the socialist system was grossly understated and hidden, 
as it took the form of privileged access to underpriced goods not available to the 
general public: special shops for party apparatchiks, foreign currency purchases 
(feeding onto a black market for hard currency), special healthcare, etc. This 
socialist inequality was probably lower than that of today’s capitalism of the 1% 
and the 0.1% where the 62 richest earn as much as the poorer half of the world 
population (Hardoon et al. 2016), but still excessive. I would add that endemic 
shortages doomed to failure any reform attempt aimed at establishing forms of 
market socialism, such as were repeatedly attempted throughout the bloc for al-
most forty years after Stalin’s death in 1953. 
The residual disagreement between me and Kornai concerns the causes of 
shortages in the socialist economy. In his 1980 book and other papers at around 
that time (1979, 1980b; and 1959 for an earlier statement), Kornai initially attrib-
uted such shortages primarily to Soft Budget Constraints (SBC), i.e., the ability of 
state enterprises to replenish their liquid financial resources through budget sub-
sidies or credit (by banks and/or suppliers) whenever money prices were raised 
in order to reduce shortages. The notion of Soft Budget Constraints is an original 
and valuable contribution by János Kornai to economic theory and policy. Vol-
ume IV (2014b) of his ten-volume Collected Works gathers 13 publications of his 
on the subject and his Introduction to the volume stresses the partial overlapping 
of SBCs with Moral Hazard and with Time Inconsistency, while claiming their 
specific additional usefulness. However, soft budgets can explain open inflation, 
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but are neither necessary nor sufficient to explain shortages, which in the best 
Walrasian tradition require as a necessary and sufficient condition simply prices 
consistently lower than their market-clearing level. Under such conditions, soft-
budget constraints make shortages persist, as they would if enterprise funds were 
fully (100%) and continuously indexed to prices, but cannot generate shortages 
in the first place. Gomulka (1985) showed that shortages did not depend on budg-
ets’ softness, but on the degree of budgets’ softness being higher than the degree 
of price flexibility: if prices were flexible, a limit to budget softness would be 
placed by either planners’ concern about resulting open inflation and its adverse 
political effects, or by the hard constraints of the real economy (Kornai’s reply 
1985). Moreover, besides causing higher open inflation, soft budget constraints 
would also result in higher indebtedness of either the government budget if it re-
plenished enterprise liquidity via budget subsidies, or of enterprises if constraints 
were softened via bank credits, or a combination of both: thus, soft budget con-
straints would be incompatible with budgetary or monetary discipline, and there-
fore possibly non-sustainable.
In later works, both in The Socialist System (1992) and in a paper on end-
ing shortages in the transition to a market economy (1995), Kornai downgraded 
SBCs from “prime mover” to concomitant cause of chronic shortage, together 
with the lack or inadequacy of private sector production and of imports. Even 
in the absence of the Walrasian feedback of excess demand on prices, or course, 
shortages are reduced and possibly may be eliminated, or even reversed, also 
by the Marshallian adjustment of enterprise output (and foreign trade) to profit 
margins, as well as by the capital-stock adjustment of actual to desired produc-
tive capacity. Naturally, both these additional mechanisms must be blocked (as 
they usually are in the centrally planned economy) for shortages to necessarily 
arise and persist. But Kornai still regarded shortages as a general feature of the 
socialist economy regardless of the price level, thus implicitly assuming a zero 
elasticity of both demand and supply with respect to prices (Kornai 1995: 155, 
Figure 1, where quantities both demanded and supplied are vertical lines parallel 
to the price level axis, moreover with demand being subject to horizontal shifts 
to higher levels even in the short run). The trouble is that we will never know 
whether this was the case: in peace time, prices were mostly an instrument of ag-
gregation in Soviet-type economies, and changed infrequently, often remaining 
virtually unchanged for decades on end. 
Holzman (1960) actually produced a measurement of excess demand for food 
in the USSR in 1937–1958, taking the ratio between the free price in the collec-
tive farms (kolkhozian) market and the official state price, and weighing such 
ratio by the share of free market turnover in total turnover (taken at the respec-
tive official and free prices at which they actually occurred). In truth, Holzman’s 
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indicator may well overstate the incidence of shortages, for in a dual price system 
(with free and controlled segments), the free price necessarily must be higher than 
the single price that would prevail in a unified market, as long as at least part of 
the consumer surplus enjoyed by buyers of a good sold at below market-clearing 
is spent on the same good in the free market, thus boosting the free price above 
what would have been its single equilibrium level. Holzman’s index was updated 
by Garvy (1977) and Dirksen (1981). However, Holzman’s series, beside the pos-
sible over-statement, takes the initial index as equal to 100 and therefore indicates 
the trend of shortages over time, but not their absolute incidence at any time. 
Both open and repressed inflation encourage dollarization, i.e., the use of for-
eign hard currencies (such as the US dollar or at one time the DM) as unit of ac-
count, means of payment, and store of value. Another indicator used to measure 
excess demand is the ratio between the black market exchange rate and the lower 
official rate for hard currencies in term of domestic currency (as in Culberston – 
Amacher 1972). The diffusion everywhere in the socialist bloc of special shops 
where goods were available for foreign exchange (and no questions asked) set a 
lower bound to the black market exchange rate, represented by the Purchasing 
Parity exchange rate for the relatively cheaper goods in those shops. For instance, 
if a bottle of vodka priced at 100 zlotys in state shops only cost 1 US$, officially 
worth only 25 zlotys, the black market exchange rate for the dollar could not be 
much lower than 100 zlotys. But it could be higher, if lifted by additional, gener-
alized excess demand over and above available supplies of goods and services. 
Yet black market exchange rates in most centrally planned economies, after the 
confiscatory currency reforms of the mid-1950s and for most of the 1970s and 
1980s tended to be contained within the range of 3 or 4 times the official rate. On 
that basis, we might conjecture that excess demand would have been eliminated 
if official state prices had been, say, doubled or trebled (considering that as indi-
cated above, the equilibrium price in a unified market must be lower than that in 
the free market segment of a dual market). Only towards the end of the Soviet-
type system, in the late 1980s, did black market exchange rates skyrocket. And in 
the price liberalization of the early 1990s transition, the elimination of shortages 
required massive price increases, often to the point of open hyper-inflation.1
Uncertainty about the persistence of the newly found market equilibrium, and 
the frequent administrative adoption of the higher prices prevailing in the free 
1  The answer to the question “What is the correct exchange rate between the rouble, the dol-
lar, and the pound?” used to be: “One dollar, one pound of roubles”. In Moscow in 1990, 
the black market exchange rate came close to fulfill this proposition: when a taxi driver 
demanded 5 dollars for his fare, I asked how much that would be in roubles, he laughed and 
answered “A kilo”. 
KORNAI: SHORTAGE VERSUS SURPLUS ECONOMIES 89
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
market segment of a dual market, naturally led to prices overshooting to levels 
higher than sustainable equilibrium prices, and to the associated transformation 
recession (Kornai’s own definition; see Nuti 1986, 2012). In conclusion, if our 
rough and ready assessment of the degree of excess demand in traditional central-
ly-planned economies is accepted, Kornai’s proposition of complete inelasticity 
of excess demand with respect to price remains a debatable conjecture. 
The subsequent approach followed by Kornai (1995) and his current position 
(Kornai 2014c) on soft budgets constraints is based on self-fulfilling expecta-
tions: “The SBC syndrome derives essentially from expectations built into deci-
sion-makers at units potentially requiring rescue. Those raising loans expect that 
if unable to repay them, somebody will bail them out” (Kornai 2014c: 73). One 
problem is that while the degree of budget softness and the degree of price flex-
ibility can be regarded as objective structural parameters of the system, expecta-
tions introduce an element of complete subjectivity into the argument. Budgets 
are soft as long as they are believed to be soft, in which case, of course, that same 
belief must be shared by the enterprise’s lenders and/or suppliers; otherwise it 
will be the belief of the most prudent of all actors (enterprise, lenders, and sup-
pliers) to determine the relevant degree of budget softness. It is hard to generalize 
such an expectations model to a whole system of state enterprises under social-
ism, labeled a “docu-monetary” system by Joseph Berliner (1957) in which offi-
cial entitlements as well as money were necessary to secure supplies. And, in any 
case, once again the identification of soft budgets with shortages is debatable. It 
is true that the perceived degree of softness may be persistently higher than the 
degree of price flexibility, thus always fulfilling Gomulka’s condition for short-
ages, but this rather sounds like a deus ex machina: if perceived budget softness 
were repeatedly overestimated, people would soon learn that this was the case, 
and such perception would stop. All the factors mentioned by Kornai as pre-
conditions for the elimination of shortages even in the presence of SBCs (private 
sector expansion, trade liberalization) presume price flexibility to the point of 
market-clearing, which in turn remains a sufficient condition for the elimination 
of shortages – as in any Walrasian world. 2
2  In our private correspondence pertaining the earlier draft of this paper, Péter Mihályi argued 
that the price level of socialist countries was perfectly adequate to clear the markets in the 
long run, with full employment of capital and labor, and no excess inventories nor shortages, 
unlike a capitalist system where under-utilization of capital and labor and excess inventories 
he regards as evidence of lack of market-clearing. Mihályi seems to confuse short and long 
run, neglecting that the long run is made up of a sequence of short runs only in which people 
conduct their daily lives; if in the short run markets never clear, they will never clear in the 
long run either. He also equates market-clearing with zero inventories, which are perfectly 
consistent with persistent excess demand. 
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Shortages arose as a typical feature of the socialist economy simply because 
socialist planners wanted to eliminate inflation, one of the main scourges of capi-
talism, but they could not, for a variety of reasons: overambitious plans, especially 
for investment, wage drift under over-full employment, partial or general under-
fulfillment of production targets, import squeezes to give priority to targets other 
than demand-supply balance, deliberate under-pricing of necessities for distributive 
considerations, or (following a distinct Stalinist strategy) excessive under-pricing 
of shoddy goods unsalable at cost-covering prices. Under such circumstances, so-
cialist planners could still pretend to have defeated inflation by decreeing prices 
at below market-clearing levels. They could not really defeat inflation, but they 
could and did repress it instead (socialist leaders adopted the same policy with 
respect to nationalisms, repressing them rather than eliminating them). 
CHINA
If shortage were a necessary feature of socialism, a dilemma arises: is China a 
shortage economy or is it fully capitalist? Admittedly, China is a very special 
case. It is most certainly not a Soviet-type socialist economy. Kornai regards it 
as being closer to capitalism than to socialism, indeed as “a particular variation 
of capitalism, generating in most sectors a surplus economy” (in our correspond-
ence and in Kornai 2016). But there is still a sizeable, quite large, though no 
longer dominant, state enterprises sector, enjoying soft-constraints and govern-
ment subsidies. And, while the Chinese economy is dominated by markets, the 
exchange rate is not market determined, for China was granted membership in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) without having to liberalize its foreign ex-
change markets; thus, the exchange rate remains a major instrument of macroeco-
nomic policy used to achieve near-full employment. There are no trade unions 
and strikes are illegal (though increasingly tolerated). Yet there are minor forms 
of financial repression, but no significant shortages, if any. Kornai (2014c) indi-
cates the existence of a Chinese private sector and openness to foreign trade as 
the main explanations for the lack of shortages in a self-styled socialist economy. 
But it might be simpler to say that shortages are not caused by the SBCs associ-
ated with socialism, but by prices set below market clearing, which may or may 
not be a necessary feature of socialism – and indeed, in China today they are not. 
Even in China’s past, for a long time, prices centrally fixed below market clear-
ing for a relatively small share of necessities were accompanied by additional 
supplies being available at free prices higher than the hypothetical single price 
that would have cleared the market – not in black markets, but under the typical 
Chinese “dual-track” pricing system.
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 THE SURPLUS ECONOMY
In his latest book, Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy (2013), János 
Kornai characterizes capitalism on the contrary as the economy of surplus, of 
excess supply (excess capacity and excess inventories), and labor unemployment 
– not cyclical à la Keynes, but chronic. He devotes great attention to conceptual 
definitions and their consistency with accounting conventions, which is desirable 
and uncontroversial. 
Kornai (2014c) recognizes the significant persistence under capitalism of 9 Soft 
Budget Spheres: (1) firms in state ownership; (2) local and regional government 
organizations; (3) budget-funded institutions and nongovernmental organizations; 
(4) banks; (5) indispensable private firms; (6) large, priority projects funded with 
public money; (7) firms and individual producers benefiting from sectoral support; 
(8) private firms rescued through corruption; and (9) central government. A tenth 
instance is that of households in special cases (such as government relief of the 
burden of debt for Hungarian households whose mortgages were denominated in 
rapidly appreciating foreign exchange). Of course, none of these instances of soft 
budgets is associated with shortages: Kornai attributes this to the existence of a 
private sector and the liberalization of foreign trade, but once again, one might as 
well attribute it to market clearing prices, without which neither private produc-
tion, nor imports, or diversion from exports necessarily prevent shortages. 
The novel aspect of Kornai’s characterization of capitalism as the surplus 
economy is its positive assessment as an environment favorable to dynamism, 
entrepreneurship and technical progress, competition, innovation, and structural 
change. Central planning, on the contrary, was ultimately responsible for sys-
temic stagnation, due to its failure to make available resources outside a rigid 
central plan, to allow experimentation, and to adequately reward the successful 
inventor and innovator. Lieutenant-general Mikhail Timofeyevich Kalashnikov 
won many medals for various versions of the bestselling AK-47 automatic rifle 
that he designed, but he died poor. 
Kornai makes a fair comparison of both systems: each has its merits and draw-
backs that he regards as inseparable and genetically implanted. He recognizes the 
misery and evil of labor unemployment associated with surplus, but argues that 
you must take the rough with the smooth: you cannot combine socialist full em-
ployment with capitalist dynamism (my teacher Maurice Dobb, a Marxist, also 
taught me that you cannot mix features of economic systems to taste, as you could 
with the ingredients of a cake). And between “really existing socialism” and “re-
ally existing capitalism” (for in his view, tertium non datur other than in the realm 
of utopias), Kornai’s personal preference, respectable like all value choices, goes 
to the surplus economy. 
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KORNAI’S EVIDENCE
Kornai supports these provocative propositions with a mass of data on technical 
inventions and their diffusion in the two systems. He lists 111 revolutionary in-
novations that since 1917 did “fundamentally change the everyday practice of 
people’s lives, work, consumption, recreation and their relationship to others” 
(2014: 5). He finds irrefutable evidence that “Capitalism produced almost all 
the breakthrough innovations and was much faster in other aspects of technical 
progress.” For instance, the time lag in the diffusion of innovation from pioneers 
to followers was much longer in socialist economies, and has been rising rather 
than shrinking over time. “Assume … that … the world revolution was victori-
ous all over the globe, without a spot of capitalism left. In such a case we would 
never have gotten the computer and the transistor radio, the refrigerator and the 
supermarket, the Internet and the escalator, CD and DVD, digital photography, 
the mobile phone and all the other revolutionary technical changes” (ibid.: 23). 
Thus, Kornai regards the promoting impact of capitalism on technical progress 
as one of its greatest virtues, and the retarding impact of socialism on technical 
progress as one of the greatest vices of that other system.
Surplus arises in the capitalist system because of factors such as monopolis-
tic competition, uncertainty of demand, economies of scale, and, above all, the 
“creative destruction” involved by innovation itself; but the main mechanism 
for the reproduction of surplus is of course the labor market. Out of a country’s 
population of Q, a number of people N are inactive because they are “incapable 
of work” in one sense or another; a number M are capable of work, but are inac-
tive because they are discouraged from seeking a job (retired on pensions; or 
depending on other means of support; prevented by traditional obstacles or by 
lack of care for children or elderly dependants; or workers discouraged by their 
unsuccessful search); a number U are registered as unemployed, and the remain-
ing E are the employed. Job vacancies V are a measure of labor shortage. Usually 
the labor force is defined as those economically active, A= E + U, but Kornai 
defines the labor surplus not as U, but as T= M + U, i.e., including those capable 
but inactive, his surplus thus corresponding to the Marxian reserve army of labor. 
T/Q is the rate of labor surplus t, M/Q is the rate m of the population capable of 
working but economically inactive, u = U/Q is the rate of unemployment, v= V/Q 
the rate of shortage.3
I would add to the causes of structural unemployment in the capitalist economy 
also the downward rigidity of prices, just as I regard their upward rigidity as the 
3  See Kornai (2014 Table 4.1, p. 91) for a comparison with standard concepts of labor market 
statistics.
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main cause of shortages under socialism. Downward price rigidity is also a fea-
ture of the labor market, although wage downward flexibility does not necessarily 
raise employment in view of its negative impact on workers’ consumption, which 
in an open economy may or may not be offset, or more than offset by higher net 
exports. Akerlof – Schiller (2009) argue that one of the causes of unemployment 
is the payment by employers of an efficiency wage higher than the supply price 
of labor. The efficiency wage minimizes labor costs per unit of output, taking into 
account the higher productivity obtained at wages higher than the supply price of 
the same employment: therefore, efficiency wages may involve unemployment, 
although a wage reduction below their efficiency level would never cause higher 
employment because it would actually raise wage costs per unit of output. 
Socialist countries were characterized by high activity rates and labor short-
age. In the transition after 1990, activity rates fell in line with capitalist countries 
and unemployment arose. Kornai confesses a healthy “irritation (even outrage)” 
at reading “that oft-repeated, canonized expression the natural rate of unemploy-
ment” (2014: 92). He distinguishes between Keynesian unemployment due to de-
mand and financial constraints, and structural unemployment induced primarily 
by Schumpeterian creative destruction due to the dynamism and innovation proc-
ess. The first is cyclical while the second is chronic, which is why labor surplus 
is present even at the peak of the cycle, is higher than just Keynesian unemploy-
ment, and rises with the degree of dynamism of a capitalist system. 
Kornai readily acknowledges some collateral damage associated with capital-
ism, in addition to unemployment. “The shortage economy is ultimately more 
egalitarian than the surplus economy” (2014: 131). Corruption tends to be larg-
er in the surplus economy, where the bribing is done by producers rather than 
by buyers; indeed, the crony capitalism of state-business connivance for Noam 
Chomsky is the only form that capitalism takes today. There can be waste in 
capitalist competition (e.g., in the automotive industry, pp. 132–134). But Kornai 
ultimately professes to be “a believer in the capitalist system” according to his 
own system of values, for two main reasons. First, because “(c)apitalism can op-
erate without democracy, but the statement cannot be reversed. Democracy can-
not operate without capitalism – ‘democratic socialism’ is impossible” (Kornai 
2016: 569).4 Second, because the capitalist surplus economy is the only system 
able to sustain and drive the continual process of modernization, innovation, and 
rapid technical progress. 
4  He provides a grand synthesis, update, and development of capitalist and socialist taxonomy, 
and relations between capitalism and democracy, also in the light of experiences in the post-
socialist region; and elsewhere, e.g., Kornai (2008).
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Capitalism may be a precondition of democracy, but, as Kornai has repeat-
edly acknowledged, it is not a sufficient condition for democracy to thrive, as 
shown for instance today by Hungarian autocracy (Kornai 2016) or the Italian 
drift towards authoritarian constitutional change; moreover, capitalist inequality 
jeopardizes democracy. And the dynamic implications of the surplus economy 
are subject to a number of qualifications. 
SOME QUALIFICATIONS
First, the contribution of the state to technical progress is underestimated by 
Kornai’s acknowledged exclusion of military and space expenditure and general-
ly the non-profit sector, without which we would not have had most Information 
Technology (IT) progress, including the Internet. Conversely, Kornai overlooks 
the negative impact of the prolonged protection of intellectual property on the 
spread of innovation under capitalism. 
Second, there have been recent re-considerations of the role of the state as 
entrepreneur. Mazzucato (2011, 2013) notes that in the most successful market 
economies, the state goes far beyond its orthodox minimalist role of creating in-
frastructure, investing in science and education and setting the rules, while leav-
ing the rest to the profit motive in markets. Mazzucato recognizes the plentiful 
examples of private sector entrepreneurial activity and dynamism in new sectors, 
funded by private sources such as venture capital, but questions their significance. 
“Silicon Valley and the emergence of the biotech industry are usually attributed 
to the geniuses behind the small high tech firms like Facebook or the plethora 
of small biotech companies in Boston or Cambridge in the UK. Europe’s ‘lag’ 
behind the USA is often attributed to its weak venture capital sector. Examples 
from these high tech sectors in the USA are often used to argue why we need less 
state and more market: to allow Europe to produce its own Googles” (Mazzucato 
2011: 20). But “the algorithm that led to Google’s success was funded by a public 
sector National Science Foundation grant”, “molecular antibodies, which provid-
ed the foundation for biotechnology before venture capital moved into the sector, 
were discovered in public Medical Research Council (MRC) labs in the UK”, 
while “many of the most innovative young companies in the USA were funded 
not by private venture capital but by public venture capital such as through the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme” (ibid.). Beyond the role 
of the state in stimulating demand, or in “picking winners” in industrial policy, 
Mazzucato (2011: 20) argues that “there is a case for a targeted, proactive, entre-
preneurial state, able to take risks, creating a highly networked system of actors 
harnessing the best of the private sector for the national good over a medium to 
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long-term horizon. It is the state as catalyst, and lead investor, sparking the initial 
reaction in a network that will then cause knowledge to spread. The state, as crea-
tor of the knowledge economy.” 
Such a role of the state is not new, but it has happened in a “hidden way” 
in order “to prevent a backlash, over the last three decades in the development 
of the computer industry, the Internet, the pharma-biotech industry, and many 
more including today’s nanotech industry. None of these technological revolu-
tions would have occurred without the leading role of the state” (ibid.: 22). Large 
state investments have enabled a decentralized network of actors to undertake the 
risky research, and to allow the development and commercialization process to 
occur in a dynamic way. The recent history of the industrial policy of the USA 
shows that despite appearances, the US state has been extremely active and entre-
preneurial in the development and commercialization of new technologies. Four 
examples – the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR), orphan drugs, and recent developments 
in nanotechnology – are used to illustrate this point. “From the development of 
aviation, nuclear energy, computers, the Internet, the biotechnology revolution, 
nanotechnology and even now in green technology, it is, and has been, the state 
not the private sector that has kick-started and developed the engine of growth, 
because of its willingness to take risk in areas where the private sector has been 
too risk-averse. In a policy environment where the frontiers of the state are now 
being deliberately rolled back, that process needs more than ever to be under-
stood so that it can successfully be replicated. Otherwise we miss an opportunity 
to build greater prosperity in the future“ (Mazzucato 2011: 24).
In a similar vein, Micklethwait – Wooldridge (2014) talk of a “global race to 
reinvent the State”: three great revolutions have brought about in turn the nation 
state, the liberal state, and the welfare state, pioneered in Europe and America. 
They argue that we are now in the middle of a fourth revolution, centered in other 
parts of the world. In Chinese-oriented Asia, for instance, experiments in state-
directed capitalism and authoritarian modernization have ushered an astonishing 
period of development. 
Finally, Kornai’s positive assessment of the surplus economy seems to have 
been somewhat mis-timed, considering both the large-scale costs of the “transfor-
mation recession” of transition economies in the 1990s, and the persistence and 
severity of the current global crisis that began in 2007 and is still rampaging. 
Kornai refrains from distinguishing “necessary” from “excessive” capacity 
reserves, inventories or labor reserves. He writes: “I refrain from these distinc-
tions not because of ignorance but, rather, because I am not able to find the right 
borderlines. I do not use these categories because they do not exist in the real 
world.” But there can be no doubt that the capitalist system as we know it today 
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has acquired surplus features to an extent that goes far beyond the level that may 
be regarded as necessary to enhance entrepreneurship and technical dynamism. 
An unemployment rate of over 12% as in the Eurozone today, with country peaks 
approaching 50% of youth (aged 16–24) unemployment, cannot possibly be con-
sidered as necessary to preserve the technical dynamism of capitalism. 
Piketty (2014) analyzed the recent generalized growth of wealth and income 
inequality, which he attributes to the rate of return r on capital being greater than 
GDP growth rate g. This undisputed fact only makes inequality trends worse, but 
even if r= g, as long as r is positive even if it is equal to or lower than g, profit 
would still be more unevenly distributed than labor wages, and accumulation of 
capital out of profit would be more unevenly distributed than savings out of wag-
es, thus providing a mechanism for increasing inequality of wealth and therefore 
of income over time. And the growth of income inequality is a major factor – via 
its adverse impact on effective demand – behind the growth of unemployment 
and therefore the “surplus” nature of the capitalist economy. 
The theory of comparative advantage predicts that with expanding global mar-
kets, income inequality in poorer countries should decrease. To date, however, 
the international record on inequality is at best mixed in the face of recent glo-
balization. Kremer – Maskin (2014) suggest that globalization may not reduce 
inequality in developing countries since skilled workers in those countries are 
recruited by multinational companies and see wage rises, while unskilled workers 
are ignored, so their wages fall. 
However governments, instead of playing their role in offsetting such natural 
trends towards growing wealth and income inequality, or alleviating the deficit 
in effective demand due to this and other causes, have adopted austerity policies 
promoted and enforced by international financial organizations and by the EU’s 
Fiscal Compact as a misguided response to the current crisis. Such austerity poli-
cies have magnified the surplus features of capitalism, condemning it to suicidal 
stagnation rather than desirable continued technical dynamism.5
Capitalism comes in many varieties, depending on alternative institutions and 
policies: we should not restrict our choice to the stark, defeatist alternative be-
tween Soviet-type socialism and neo-liberal capitalism, and never abandon the 
search for an improved version of capitalism. In his presentation at the WINIR 
Conference, Kornai (1914a) accepts this, in spite of his skepticism. 
Stanislaw Gomulka commented on a first version of this paper that “Our in-
dividual views on the merits of each system are not that important. Given the 
5  Nuti (2014) showed that following the IMF upwards revision of the size of fiscal multipliers, 
fiscal consolidation can raise the debt/GDP ratio, though his proof needs the tacit assumption 
that the starting position is a balanced budget. 
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huge variation of views on that subject and the absence of a generally accepted 
theoretical method to rank systems, what is important is to have the freedom to 
choose through a generally accepted political process. This is something we did 
not have under the communist political system.”6 
Unfortunately, at present the dominance of neo-liberal ideology, the gener-
alized adoption of austerity policies, and the competitive pressures of our glo-
balized world are increasingly reducing the scope for our democratic choice of 
our preferred variety of the capitalist system. 
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